Conviction by a 4×3 Verdict in the Jury Trial and the Violation of the In Dubio Pro Reo Principle

Abstract

This Undergraduate Thesis examines the compatibility between conviction by simple majority (4×3) in the Jury Trial and the constitutional principle of in dubio pro reo, understood as a corollary of the presumption of innocence and a foundational element of the accusatorial criminal process. The study starts from the observation that the current decision-making system, by allowing the imposition of criminal punishment with only a one-vote difference, exposes the fragility of the Brazilian model, which ultimately institutionalizes doubt as a criterion for punishment and undermines the democratic legitimacy of the verdict. The general objective of this research is to demonstrate that the 4×3 model is incompatible with the constitutional guarantees afforded to the accused and, therefore, to propose the adoption of a qualified majority (5×2) as a means of ensuring greater evidentiary rigor and rationality in judicial decision-making. Methodologically, the study adopts a dogmatic, critical, and comparative

approach, based on the analysis of constitutional and procedural norms governing the Jury Trial, the examination of specialized legal scholarship - particularly the works of Aury Lopes Jr., Rodrigo Faucz, and Daniel Avelar - and the observation of concrete examples that illustrate parameters of legal certainty and legitimacy. The results indicate that the simple majority quorum weakens the in dubio pro reo principle, disrupts the equality of arms, and reinforces practices marked by inquisitorial bias. It is concluded that the adoption of a qualified majority (5×2), combined with deliberation among jurors and a minimum level of legal education for these citizens, represents a viable path to reconciling the sovereignty of verdicts with due process of law, thereby strengthening the democratic and rights-protective character of the Jury Trial within the Constitutional State governed by the rule of law.